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There is hardly a corner of political theory that has not benefited
from Iris Marion Young’s critical and discerning eye. Democratic the-
ory, feminist theory, theories of justice and globalization, race and
identity, public sphere and responsibility, equality and poverty, her
interests and writing spread out and touch all issues pertaining to
repair the world. In this remark on the impact of her work, I want
to take up one small but for me very important contribution she made
to democratic theory generally and deliberative democratic theory
more particularly.
A cornerstone of the deliberative turn in democratic theory
has been the insistence that democracy means more and requires more
than equal voting rights. The move from a vote-centric to a talk-cen-
tric view of democracy has shone a spotlight on the processes, con-
texts and milieus in which citizens form their opinions, make claims
and demands on each other, come to understandings, ask for justifi-
cations and expect accountability. Democratic theory now focuses on
the communicative spaces of opinion and will formation. And from
its first appearance on the scene, deliberative democratic theory,
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whether influence by Habermas or Rawls, has stressed the values of
inclusion and equality in these processes. It is not enough to give
everyone the vote if everyone does not also have a say. But nestled
within earlier articulations of deliberative democracy was a blind spot.
Iris Marian Young exposed this blind spot and in so doing changed
deliberative democratic theory in a dramatic way.
In her work on inclusion, especially the 2000 book Inclusion
and Democracy, Young noted that most people interested in inclusion
focus on the problem of external exclusion and miss what she calls
internal inclusion. External exclusion “refers to the fact that alleged-
ly participatory processes often exclude members of racial and eth-
nic minorities, have fewer women than men, fewer working class peo-
ple than professionals, are often age-biased, and rarely involve peo-
ple with disabilities.”1 The problem here is one of being left out –
especially left out of discussion and decision-making process. With
regard to external exclusions, Young and deliberative democratic the-
ory are on the same page as a great deal of that theory is precisely
designed as a critical standard against which to expose the failures
of the public sphere to include all citizens in the conversation. 
It is with her second type of exclusion, what she calls inter-
nal exclusion, that Young changed the face of deliberative democrat-
ic theory as well a great deal of public reason literature. Here she
argued that it was not enough to have excluded minorities in the room
if the unstated expectations of appropriate or proper speaking dimin-
ished the value and weight of what they said. The problem here is
not being left out but rather not being heard. By questioning what
we consider appropriate and “reasoned” contributions to deliberation,
Young exposed a rationalist bias in much of deliberative democracy
theory. She opened up an amazingly rich world of idioms, cadences,
passion and poetry closed to deliberative democracy by an unques-
tioned legacy of the Enlightenment. This is the anti-rhetoric legacy
that sees serious debate about political and public issues to require a
rhetoric-free zone governed by reason. But the mistake here is to
think that reason (in the sense of having good reasons) can be iden-
tified with a particular way or style of speaking. 
For many Enlightenment thinkers, rhetoric was the category
in which all inappropriate speech fell. It contained not only impas-
sioned appeals to the heart but any speech that trespassed beyond the
narrow confines of reasoned argument. Listen to Kant on the sub-
ject: he defines rhetoric as the art “of deceiving by means of beau-
tiful illusion” and tells us that it would be beneath the dignity of rea-
sonable men to “exhibit even a trace of the exuberance of wit and
imagination, and still more, the art of talking men round and preju-
dicing them in favor” of some proposal.2 The Federalist Papers is
another Enlightenment document where one can see the enshrining
of a dispassionate, cool headed, moderated, literal, and informative
speech as the voice of neutral reason. 
Iris Marion Young questioned the assumptions propping up the
distrust of rhetoric and indeed any speech that appeared to appeal to
the interlocutor. Her arguments are as devastating as they are simple.
There are three. First, when it comes to political speech, the dispas-
sionate versus passionate dichotomy so popular among the Founding
Fathers is deeply suspect. The claim that dispassionate speech is some-
how neutral and rational is itself often a rhetorical move to dress-up
self-interested claims in the guise of neutrality. Her second argument
is that attempting to identify a mode of speech that is non-rhetorical
or neutral often has the effect of excluding those who speak in a dif-
ferent idiom or with a different cadence. The groups regularly iden-
tified as lacking sufficient neutrality in speech have been overwhelm-
ingly drawn from the marginalized or less powerful in society. Finally,
she argues that rhetoric can actually be a very positive force in dia-
logue. In trying to persuade a particular audience, rhetoric can be
attentive to the needs and interests of the audience in a way that a
detached, ‘neutral’ speech may not. Young offers a compelling account
of the ways that passion, trope, metaphor and evocation can enhance
dialogue and further the ends of mutual understanding. While all three
arguments are powerful, it is the last that has had the most profound
impact on deliberative theory. The reason why we should “allow”
multiple rhetorics, forms of expression and nontraditional communi-
cation into deliberation is not simply because devaluing these forms
of speech devalues the contributions of those who speak in these voic-
es, that is, it is not simply a matter of fairness. We also should open
the doors to multiple forms of speech because in deliberation we want
people to speak to each other and not at each other.
Running through all three of these arguments and indeed her
whole discussion of internal exclusion is the insight that deliberation
is not just about exchanging reasons, it is about real people speak-
ing to each other. The importance of this distinction came home to
me when, on first reading Inclusion and Democracy, I noticed that
Young devoted an entire section to greeting. What, I thought to myself,
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has greeting got to do with the serious business of democracy under
conditions of pluralism. Through a wonderful rereading of Levinas,
Young argued that the public exchange of reasons cannot hope to
have an impact on democracy unless participants acknowledge each
other and indeed touch each other with their word. This dimension
of communication requires more than arguments: “The category of
greeting thus adds something important to ideals of inclusive public
reason. It is not simply that participants in public discussion should
have reasons that others can accept, but they must also explicitly
acknowledge the others whom they aim to persuade.”
3 
While greeting
is only one of the many things we can do in deliberation to make
people feel acknowledged and listened to, it highlights that success-
ful deliberation always needs to be attentive to the participants as
people. Thus rhetoric rather than seen as a tool of manipulation should
be seen as a tool of communication, indeed a certain sign of respect
and recognition. It asks us to seek out the words, tone and narrative
that will touch the other. But more importantly, it asks us to resist
the temptation to evaluate the cogency of a claim or argument on the
basis of the way it is said. She tells us that we “should not privilege
specific ways of making claims and arguments. Participants in com-
municative democracy should listen to all modes of expression that
aim to co-operate and reach a solution to collective problems.”4
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Inclusion and Democracy, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 62.
4 Inclusion and Democracy, (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 80.
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